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Public finances and Public Private Partnerships in the European Union 






We analyse the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in order to account for their uneven 
distribution among the European Union countries and to identify the motivations of the 
public actor in selecting PPPs. We focus on the fiscal incentives to overcome budget 
and borrowing constraints, taking also into account of the political features and 
institutional frameworks of the countries. Using IMF data over the years 1990-2015, we 
confirm that the state of public finances impacts on the government’s choice of PPPs: 
financially constrained governments find the PPP option more attractive due to the 
possibility of off-balance accounting, while high-debt countries reduce the private 
investors’ interest in PPP. Fiscal rules increased the PPP bias in the pre-crisis period, 
while the post-crisis reforms and the increased surveillance seem to better discipline 
PPP employment. PPPs are, also, confirmed to be under the influence of political 
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Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are special forms of public procurement that have emerged since 
the 1990s and in time have evolved into complex and sophisticated mechanisms, linking governments 
to the business sector, but, at the same time, challenging decision-making processes and increasing 
fiscal risks in the long run. A large literature has focused on the factors that determine the success or 
failure of PPP projects, and their determinants have been extensively examined for developing and 
emerging countries (Jensen and Blanc-Brude, 2005; Hammami, 2006; Checherita, 2009; Mengistu, 
2013; Percoco, 2014; Kasri and Wibowo, 2015; Reyes-Tagle and Garbacik, 2016; Moszoro et al., 
2017; Fleta-Asin et al., 2019; Quélin et al., 2019). However, quantitative analyses at the European 
Union (EU) level is lagging behind. Antellini Russo and Zampino (2012), Buso et al. (2017) and 
Mazzola et al. (2019) provide for some econometric evidence for French and Italian municipal PPPs, 
while only Mota and Moreira (2015) examine both financial and non-financial determinants of PPPs 
in 17 EU countries. As Verhoest et al. (2015) observe, there is still need for comparative analyses that 
account for the differences in the development of PPP projects at national level and in the uptake of 
PPPs across the EU countries. 
Indeed, even if the EU states share a general regulatory framework - the EU directives have 
established a very favourable uniform legislation for PPPs and imposed binding norms aimed at 
granting fair competition -, PPPs are very unevenly distributed. The PPP market is concentrated in a 
few countries – the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland -, while the others have either 
a PPP policy but few projects - France and Germany – or proved sceptical of both PPP policy and its 
implementation – the Nordic countries and some new accession countries. This means that the EU 
member states have responded differently to the PPP trend that has invested public management.  
The perspective of this study is to consider the motivations of the public actor in selecting PPPs, in 
particular, the fiscal incentive to overcome budget and borrowing constraints, and connect them to 
the country’s political and institutional frameworks. In presence of restrictions on the financial 
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resources, PPPs allow spreading public sector payments through time and relax governments’ budget 
constraints in the short term. If the funding constraints are not recognised, PPPs create the illusion of 
being much less expensive than traditional public investments. Indeed, when governments are given 
the possibility to record PPP investments off the balance sheet, fiscal illusion and debt-hiding 
motivations may create an unwarranted bias in favour of the partnerships (Välilä, 2005).  
These features may be differently appealing to the EU governments. We, therefore, situate the PPP 
choice in the countries’ political and institutional context, focusing on the factors that can mitigate 
the logic of fiscal illusion. In particular, we consider the role of the institutional provisions that 
increase policy stability and reduce the discretionary power of the public actor, namely the presence 
of fiscal rules and check and balances. The role of checks and balances in the choice of PPPs has been 
investigated for developing countries (Bertelli, 2019; Bertelli et al., 2020), while the impact of fiscal 
rules has so far been neglected.  
Our analysis considers the EU countries1 and, drawing from the IMF database on PPPs investments, 
estimates a fixed-effects regression with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors over the years 
1990- 2015 without sector limitations. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the 
development of PPP in the EU countries. Section 3 reviews the main literature on PPP determinants. 
Section 4 presents the research method and Section 5 discusses the main results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. PPPs in the EU countries 
Investments in PPPs at the EU level have grown in absolute value since the 1990s with two waves of 
increase and a downturn due to the last crisis (Figure 1). Among investment projects, PPPs have been 
the most affected by the recession - PPP investment fell from € 30 bn. in 2005 to € 8.7 bn. in 2017 – 
and have experienced a shift from large projects in the years preceding the crisis towards smaller 
deals since 2009 (Kappeler and Nemoz, 2010). After the crisis the PPP market did not completely 
                                                          
1 Malta, Romania and Estonia are not considered because of missing data. 
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collapse (EPEC, 2009), but  proceeded at a much slower pace. This trend is largely explained by the 
emergence of a very cautious political attitude, also fed by mixed evidence on PPP performance. 
In some instances, PPPs have allowed countries to speed up infrastructure construction, procure large-
scale infrastructure plans through a reduced number of tender procedures, delivered better on-time 
and on-budget performance compared with traditional infrastructure delivery (MacDonald, 2002, 
NAO, 2003). However, in other cases PPPs have revealed disappointing failures: poorly designed 
projects, over-optimism regarding the use and demand of the planned infrastructure, too high 
remuneration rates on the private partner’s risk capital, delays and cost increases, or, at least no better 
performance than traditional procurement. Some countries complain that PPPs create long-term 
contractual rights to public resources and risk to crowd out other items of expenditure. Besides, during 
the crisis several failed PPPs in the EU periphery countries called for expensive governments’ 
bailouts. While enhanced capital constraints have limited the banks’ exposure to infrastructure 
financing or made them more selective, previously active international players have become more 
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The European Commission and Eurostat have fostered uniformity of PPPs policies in member states 
by setting codes and regulations that have especially influenced the procurement stage. However, 
very different levels of PPPs take-up can be observed. The capital stock arising from PPPs diverges 
strongly across countries (Figure 2), with Portugal, the United Kingdom and Greece distinguishing 
as those with the highest percentage of PPPs-related capital, while Croatia and Luxembourg show the 
lowest figures.  
 
Figure 2 - Countries distribution according to PPP volumes 
a) Fourth quartile      b) third quartile 
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3. Literature background 
Public finance factors have been included among the drivers of public investments (Mehrorta and 
Välilä, 2006; Gali and Perotti, 2003) and also of PPPs in studies relating the PPP option to the 
governments’ strategy of avoiding excessive public borrowing (Benito et al., 2008; McQuaid and 
Scherrer, 2008; Vecchi et al., 2010; Cruz and Marques, 2011; Fernandes et al., 2015; Reeves, 2015; 
Bergere, 2016; Albalate et al., 2015; van den Hurk, 2018). Among the quantitative analyses for the 
EU countries, econometric evidence for French and Italian municipal PPPs (Antellini Russo and 
Zampino, 2012; De Marco et al., 2012; Buso et al., 2017) shows a significant relationship between 
PPP tenders and local government’s budgetary results. While van den Hurk et al. (2016) argue that 
budgetary reasons were essential for the choice of PPPs in Southern EU member states, Petersen 
(2010) find that where the fiscal constraints were less compelling, countries (e.g. Denmark and 
Sweden) have been less eager to opt for PPPs. Only Mota and Moreira (2015) find a negative 
relationship between the budget deficit and the value of PPPs.  
The EU accounting rules are deemed to have contributed to the preference for PPPs, because, under 
certain conditions, they allow for the partnerships registration as off-balance-sheet items and for the 
share of PPP-related debt not being considered for the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) compliance 
(Benito et al., 2008; Cruz and Marques, 2011; Reeves, 2015; Bergere, 2016)2. The off-balance sheet 
motive may also shape the characteristics of the PPP policy (Fernandes et al., 2015; van den Hurk, 
2018), determine distortions, delays, and cancellation of some public investment decisions (Reeves, 
2015). In some cases, it may prime over the project’s merit or value for money (Acerete et al., 2019) 
and may be responsible for low quality and fiscally costly projects (Engel et al., 2014) or for pushing  
public authorities in sectors where PPP do not add value (Riess, 2005). Buso et al. (2017) conclude 
                                                          
2 PPP-related assets are classified off the balance sheet of the government if: (1) the private partner bears the construction 
risk (e.g., late delivery or additional costs), (2) the private partner bears either availability (volume and quality of output) 
or demand risk (variability of demand), and (3) the risks are not incurred by the government through other means (e.g., 
government guarantees or early redemption clauses). Therefore, when enough risk is transferred to the private partners, 
the PPP-related investment does not show on the government balance sheet. 
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that, for French municipalities, the debt-hiding motivation was relevant, but not sufficient to explain 
the PPP choice.  
The choice of PPPs to circumvent the fiscal constraints may expose the public sector to higher than 
expected costs (Jensen and Dowlatabadi, 2018), and to running contingent liabilities, which are 
related to the presence of guarantees that may be triggered by a future event and are difficult to 
evaluate in amounts and timing (Cebotari et al., 2009). These guarantees transfer the financial risk to 
taxpayers and, when called, they may cause large sudden outlays for the public sector (IMF, 2012). 
Their off-balance accounting treatment implies an underestimation of the future burden on taxpayers 
(Stafford et al., 2010; Fernandes et al., 2015). 
The fiscal motivations may combine with the politicians’ incentive to opt for PPPs to increase their 
political consensus in a context of curtailed budgets, especially during periods of fiscal distress 
(Cappellaro and Longo, 2011; Reeves, 2015). In many instances, political convenience has led 
governments to employ PPPs, claiming that there was no other viable alternative, and, thus, 
dismissing the need to show their value for money (Hall, 2008). The political convenience of PPPs 
is, however, multi-dimensional (Coghill and Woodward,2005): PPPs not only help pleasing the 
electorate by providing services and avoiding upfront costs, but they also free revenues to be used for 
other targets and help governments gain the recognition of good management.  
As PPP adoption is different according to national institutional settings, the role of institutional factors 
has attracted the attention of the literature. The presence of institutional actors that control the public 
investment process can stabilize the environment for PPP decision-making (Savitch, 1998). Bertelli 
(2019) and Bertelli et al. (2020) argue that the political risk to which PPPs are exposed can be reduced 
by increasing the number of veto points that make the political environment more predictable and 




4. Methodological approach 
As the Chow test confirms the existence of a structural break in 2008, in correspondence of the great 
recession, we estimate two models based on the years before (1990-2008) and after (2008- 2015) the 
break point respectively. According to the Mundlak (1978) approach 3  (given the presence of 
heteroscedasticity), both subsamples are better fitted with a fixed-effects estimator. As standard error 
estimates are severely biased, if not appropriately accounted for, we verify the presence/absence of 
cross-section independence (Pesaran, Breusch and Pagan test4) and contemporaneous correlation5 
(Inoue and Solon test and Wooldridge –Drukker WD test). The results of the cross-sectional 
dependence tests point to different conclusions6, while those on contemporaneous correlations are not 
reliable for an order superior to one. Therefore, we prefer an estimator that contemporarily addresses 
both departures from the canonical assumptions. Then, we estimate a fixed effect model with Driscoll 
and Kraay (1998) standard errors (eq.1) for the EU countries: 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
where, the subscript i denotes the country and the subscript t denotes the year. The disturbance term 
is given by two error components, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 with 𝛼𝑖 representing the country effect, which we 
assume to be a fixed effect, including cultural and historic aspects, by assumption correlated with the 
regressors. The term 𝑢𝑖𝑡is the stochastic error. Time dummies are not included as the corresponding 
test has been rejected.  
                                                          
3 See Pinzon (2015) for a practical description.  
4 See, for a general overview, De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), while for the specific used tests: Pesaran (2004) and 
Breusch and Pagan (1980)  
5 See for a general overview Wursten (2018), while for the specific used tests: Inoue and Solon (2006), Drukker (2003) 
and Wooldridge (2010) 
6 While Pesaran’s test confirms the existence of cross-section independence (p value: 1.6 and 1.5 for the samples before 
and after the crisis), the Breusch and Pagan’s test rejects such hypothesis.  
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Previous studies (Mazzola et al., 2019; Checherita, 2009 and Hammami et al., 2006) address the 
particular nature of PPPs investment series (high incidence of zeroes) by estimating a Tobit model. 
As there is no theoretical reason to use this estimator because the zeros correspond to real 
observations, we follow the strand of the literature that employs linear models (Mota and Moreira, 
2015; Kasri and Wibowo, 2015; Moszoro et al., 2015 and Mengistu, 2013). As a robustness check, 
in order to address the zeros issue, we also present a conditional fixed-effect model (Wooldridge, 
1999). 
Our dependent variable (𝑝𝑝)  is the PPPs investment (billions, constant international dollars) from 
the IMF database7. Real GDP and financial variable sare expressed in logarithm and lagged8  (Table 
1). Thus, regressors are predetermined with respect to the dependent variable and reverse causality 
should be excluded. No collinearity issues pertain to the model. The VIF and tolerance are 
below/above critical thresholds. 
We employ different fiscal variables to test the relevance of the budgetary constraints that make 
infrastructure assets recording out of the government’s book particularly appealing. Employing the 
General Government net lending/borrowing (budget balance),we test the hypothesis that stronger 
public finances make the off-balance sheet motive less relevant and the choice of PPP less necessary 
or attractive. Hence, we expect a negative sign for the budget balance, which has also been the main 
variable of interest for the surveillance under the EU fiscal rules until the 2011 SGP reform. For the 
debt variable (debt), we put forward the hypothesis that, rather than motivating creative accounting 
practices, high levels of debt increase the perception of the country risk and undermine the investors’ 
confidence and their interest in PPPs. We therefore expect a negative sign for the debt variable. 
 
                                                          
7 The IMF database includes total PPP projects commitments taken from the European Investment Bank (EIB) for 
European countries and the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database for low- and middle-income 
countries. EIB includes long-time PPP projects above 5 million Euros planned by central governments and records them 
at the time of financial close ( Kappeler and Nemoz,2010). 
8 The variable eufund and the index of fiscal rules are only lagged. 
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Table 1. Determinants of PPP investment 
Variables Description Source Expected 
coefficient 
Public finance 
budget balance General Government net lending (+)/borrowing 
(-) 
AMECO - 
debt General Government gross debt  AMECO - 
totrev Tax revenues AMECO +/- 
Eufundub_ EU funding ECB +/- 
gov_ cons Share of consumption expenditure (% GDP)  AMECO + 
Institutions 
rules Fiscal rule index (normalized) IMF +/- 
pub_corr Public Sector corruption index  QoG +/- 
checks Number of veto players QoG - 
Economic structure 
realgdp Real GDP IMF + 
int_rate Real long-term interest rate AMECO - 
exp No. of years of experience with PPPs IMF/EIB + 
Political features  
right/left/centre Left/right centre-wing governments CPDS +/- 
fragm Political fragmentation  QoG - 
 
To complete the public finance framework, we include also the revenue and expenditure sides of the 
budget. On the one hand, high taxes generally correspond to high levels of recurring expenditures, 
which have to be financed leaving little room for discretionary spending, investments included 
(Reyes-Tagle and Garbacik, 2016). On the other hand, the availability of large tax revenues would 
reduce the need for alternative sources investment financing (Rosell and Saz-Carranza, 2019; 
Albalate et al., 2015). We employ the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP (totrev) and do not form any 
prior on the sign of the coefficient. The expenditure side of the budget is proxied by the share of 
government consumption in GDP terms (gov_cons). The variable accounts for the level of public 
services whose provision may absorb the available public resources, leaving little room for 
investments, which would have to search for alternative forms of public procurement - including 
PPPs: hence, we would expect a positive coefficient.  
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Finally, as the recourse to PPPs should increase when supplemented by other financing sources, we 
also introduce data for EU funding (eufund). By blending EU funds in PPPs, the public sector can 
make a project more affordable. However, EU funding entails the respect of additional requirements, 
and, especially in presence of weak administrative capacity, this may discourage the PPP use.  
We, then, proceed by accounting for the role of institutions to control fiscal illusion. First, we 
investigate the role of fiscal rules. The empirical literature supports the idea that well-designed rules 
promote better fiscal performances, but also increase the risk of  governments’ shifting from overt to 
hidden forms of borrowing and employing opportunistic behaviours (increased implicit liabilities, 
creative accounting practices, optimistic fiscal forecasts).   
The EU fiscal rules have undergone several changes since the original Maastricht Treaty targets. Until 
the crisis, the EU rules were focused on deficit targets and the corrective arm, but their 
implementation was less than satisfactory (Morris et al., 2006). The preventive arm, fiscal 
surveillance in the European semester, an expenditure rule and a specific debt rule were 
operationalised only after the 2011 reform. No explicit Golden rule was introduced, but a smoothing 
of the investments9 and an investment allowance10 have been put in place since 2011.  
To consolidate public finances and reassure investors after the crisis, domestic fiscal rules in the EU 
countries have grown in number (from less than 60 to 113 in 2017) and stringency. They mainly 
target the budget balance, even if debt, expenditure and revenue rules are also increasingly present. 
                                                          
9 In the computation of the expenditure growth to be compared with the country specific expenditure benchmark, the 
current level of investment is replaced with the average over the previous four years in order to support investment and 
avoid that, especially for small countries, peaks in investment in specific years could cause non-compliance with the 
expenditure rule. 
10 This has the effect of relaxing the medium-term objective convergence obligation and can be asked for by countries 
which satisfy strict conditions: 1) economic growth is negative or well below its potential; 2) the deviation does not lead 
to a breach of the 3% deficit ceiling and the debt rule is respected; 3) the deviation is linked to national expenditures on 
projects cofounded by the EU. 
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Only Germany (1969-2010) and the United Kingdom (1997-2008) introduced a Golden rule that 
limited government borrowing at the level of investments11.  
We build an index of fiscal rules strength12  and advance the hypothesis that, absent a Golden rule 
and adequate surveillance, supranational and domestic rules increase the deliverance of 
infrastructures out of the balance sheet. However, more stringent rules, investment protection clauses 
and stricter surveillance should deliver the opposite result. To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
studies have checked for this aspect. 
 As political institutions may discipline the political potential of PPP, we test for the role of checks 
and balances, which increase political stability, reduce the political risk faced by businesses, and 
influence the investment decisions of public managers. We expect that their presence reduces the 
employment of PPPs, as it impacts on the fiscal illusion logic by limiting the possibility for politicians 
to employ PPPs to undertake pork-barrel projects at the benefit of their constituencies (Maskin and 
Tirole, 2008). The variable employed is checks from the QOG database. 
On the contrary, the political potential of PPPs may be enhanced by the vulnerability of the 
administrative environment, namely by the presence of corruption, given that PPP projects have 
specific characteristics - the value of the assets, the interaction between public and private subjects - 
that make them particularly vulnerable (Rosell and Saz-Carranza, 2019). We employ the Quality of 
Government (QoG) measure of the corruption in the public sector (pub_corr). A more controlled 
environment and institutional limits to the actions of the policymaker are expected to discipline PPP 
investments and increase the private sector’s confidence, while higher levels of public corruption 
                                                          
11  In Germany the rule allowed for a transgression of the limit, if the government declared a macroeconomic 
disequilibrium. In the United Kingdom, the rule was applied over the economic cycle and complemented by a sustainable 
investment rule to keep public sector net debt at a stable and prudent level over the cycle (40% GDP). 
12 We use the IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset 2016, which collects  four types of rules (budget balance rules, debt rules, 
expenditure rules, and revenue rules), their characteristics (coverage, monitoring procedures, enforcement procedures, 
and institutional supporting features) by government's level (national and supranational) of adoption. Following 
Schaechter et al. (2012) methodology, we compute a normalized overall index, by summing up the sub-indices by level 
of government.  Each sub-index is also built as a simple sum of its five or six characteristics scores and it is normalized 
in order to run between 0 and 1. 
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reduce the attractiveness of PPPs for private investors (Galilea and Medda, 2010). However, it could 
also be possible that higher corruption produces an inflated expenditure in PPPs. Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1998) and Haque and Kneller (2008) observe this effect on public capital projects.. Corruption stakes 
go together with project complexity, that is higher for large infrastructure, like those that employ PPP 
financing (Iossa et al., 2013). Hence, we do not form any prior on the expected sign of the corruption 
index.  
Finally, we include country-level controls to account for the domestic economic structure and the 
business environment. A large number of potential consumers and bigger markets are an incentive 
for private party’s participation in PPPs. In particular, we consider the real GDP (realgdp), as a proxy 
of the private sector market power.  Given that considerable administrative capability is necessary for 
the implementation of PPP projects, previous experience represents either a reputational capital 
(Galilea and Medda, 2010) or a catalyst of future successes (Ng et al, 2012). We consider the number 
of years with positive investment in PPPs as representative of the level of expertise (exp) and expect 
a positive sign, given that countries are more likely to implement larger PPPs investment the more 
experienced they are with such programs. Finally, we consider the lending interest rate (int_rate), 
which is representative of the discount rate used to decide on PPPs investment decision. 
At the end, we test for the relevance of political factors and consider the government’s political 
orientation, which is captured by the relative power position (right/left/centre) of the parties in 
government measured by their seat share in the parliament. According to Savitch (1998), in the UK 
the propensity for PPPs seems to be associated to left parties, which support a larger provision of 
public services. However, Li (2003) finds that PPPs have become the trend in the UK, independently 
from the party to power. Seemingly, Collin (1998) finds no difference between left- and right-wing 
party policies in supporting PPPs in Sweden. Albalate et al. (2015) confirm the pragmatic—rather 
than the ideological— origins of the private participation decision in the US. Given the not conclusive 
evidence of the literature, we form no prior on the expected sign of the coefficients. 
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To analytically account for political competition we employ the government’s fractionalization index 
(fragm) from the QOG database. The more fragmented the government, the more heterogeneous the 
preferences and the political attempts to satisfy these conflicting demands by means of private sector 
resources. However, fragmentation can also imply a status quo politics and the impossibility to decide 
on complex projects such as infrastructure. Accordingly, we expect a negative coefficient for the 
variable. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
Our results (Table 2) confirm a significant impact of some fiscal variables and significantly explain 
the different uptake of PPPs across European countries and their distribution. The positive coefficient 
for GDP, although not always significant, confirms the existence of a relation between PPP policies 
and the country’s market size only after 2008. The coefficient for GDP is, instead, negative for the 
1990-2008 period, when – except for the United Kingdom – the countries employing PPPs were 
mostly small economies. The real interest rate has no impact on PPP investment.  
The hypothesis on the past experience with PPPs is confirmed by the positive and significant 
coefficient of the exp variable. Although we employ a different variable, this result is in line with 
Mota and Moreira (2015). Indeed, public agencies need time and skills to build the necessary 
institutional arrangements and the capacity to handle PPPs projects - for example through the creation 
of PPPs units or agencies, standardised contracts or procedures for evaluation and implementation 







Table 2 - Fixed effect model with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors 
 Sub-periods 
 1990-2008 2008-2015 
GDP -2.5* -3.2*** -3.8*  0.91 1.00 2.9* 
 (-2.79) (-4.49) (-2.55)   -0.98 -0.83 -2.17        
int_rate 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 -0.84 -0.69 -1.10 -0.26 (-0.56) -0.46        
exp 0.1*** 0.1*** 0.1*** 0.02 0.03** 0.04*** 
 -6.23 -5.76 -4.94 -1.91 -3.54 -6.13        
rules 7.7** 7.9*** 8.4**  -1.6** -1.6* -1.8* 
 -3.72 -4.29 -3.35 (-3.04) (-2.81) (-2.29)        
totrev 19.17*** 19.71*** 20.02*** 7.378* 7.738* 8.618** 
 -7.37 -8.61 -6.34 -2.72 -2.80 -2.96        
debt -5.657*** -5.864*** -6.065*** -0.849*** -0.771*** -0.618* 
 (-6.99) (-8.89) (-6.11)   (-7.93) (-6.84) (-2.38)        
budget balance -13.8*** -13.0*** -12.4*** -7.9*** -7.6*** -6.1*** 
 (-7.71) (-6.46) (-4.02)   (-5.66) (-5.27) (-5.30)        
eufund -44.5 -48.4 -41.7 3.1 -3.2 -16.1** 
 (-1.70) (-1.75) (-1.64)   -0.31 (-0.40) (-3.35)        
gov_cons 7.0*** 7.2*** 7.3*** -2.7*** -2.56*** -1.9** 
 -8.24 -10.66 -7.45 (-4.30) (-4.26) (-3.20)        
pub_corr 3.94 4.73 1.35 0.45 0.23 0.84 
 (-1.02) (-1.08) (-0.46) (-0.53) (-0.39) (-2.08)        
fragm -0.67 -0.75 -0.9**  -3.24** -4.6*** -5.4** 
 (-1.81) (-1.93) (-3.83)   (-3.72) (-4.23) (-3.68)        
checks -0.12 -0.16 -0.08 -0.137* -0.07 -0.02 
 (-0.96) (-1.06) (-0.59)   (-2.47) (-1.71) (-0.60)        
left 0.007*           0.01***   
 (-2.64)           (-4.70)          
right  -0.01           -0.007***  
  (-1.64)           (-4.72)         
cent   0.00   0.00 
   (-1.21)     (-1.82)        
_cons 244.20 262.40 231.80 -9.10 17.84 56.47 
 (-2.03) (-2.05) (-1.98) (-0.16) (-0.37) (-1.85)        




As expected, the relationship between PPPs and the budget balance is particularly significant in both 
periods: a worsening in the budget position and the shortage of government funding encourage the 
use of PPPs. This result is in line with the econometric results in Albalate et al. (2015) for the US 
states, in Buso et al. (2017) and in Antellini Russo and Zampini (2012) for Italian and French 
municipalities respectively. Still they are in line with a large literature based on surveys and case 
studies ( Benito et al., 2008; McQuaid and Scherrer, 2008; Vecchi et al., 2010; Cruz and Marques, 
2011; Fernandes et al., 2015; Reeves, 2015; Bergere, 2016; Albalate et al., 2015; van den Hurk, 2018). 
These results are at odds only with Mota and Moreira (2015), who find a positive relationship that is 
rationalised as the effect of government’s credibility (due to public finance consolidation) on business 
confidence. From the relevance of the fiscal motive follows the need to develop appropriate 
accounting rules to avoid that the possibility of off-balance sheet registration has a distorting effect 
on PPP investment decision and that the distribution of risks in the project is influenced more by the 
PPP statistical treatment rather than by the principles of optimal risk assignment. 
The negative coefficient of the debt variable for the whole period confirms that high public debt 
hampers PPP investments. The debt target of the Maastricht rules, relevant for the Euro Area 
membership, was not operationalised until 2011 by establishing the debt-reduction benchmark. 
However, debt levels had an impact on the country risk perception by private investors: high levels 
of public debt reduce the government’s credibility, discourage private investors and refrain them from 
participating in PPP projects. The impact of public debt on PPPs is higher for the pre-crisis period 
and much lower after. This result complements the empirical evidence in Bacchiocchi et al. (2011) 
who point to high levels of public debt distorting the allocation of public expenditure and hampering 
public investment.  
The positive and significant coefficient of tax revenues points to the fact that governments with a 
high tax burden are more eager to resort to PPPs. The coefficient for the pre-crisis period nearly 
doubles that for the post-crisis years. The share of government consumption positively and 
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significantly affects PPPs investments from 1990 to 2008, signifying that, when the level of public 
services is high, the involvement of private partners is an alternative with respect to more traditional 
types of financing to deliver and operate infrastructure. After 2008, fiscal consolidation and the need 
to preserve the levels of some essential services implied a general withdrawal from investments, PPP 
included: this explains the negative and significant coefficient of the gov_cons variable. 
The variable for the EU funding contribution has the expected negative sign confirming the 
disincentive of the high requirements imposed by the EU grant application process. However, it is 
not always significant.  
The negative sign of the coefficient for the number of checks and balances confirms – as in Bertelli 
et al. (2020) - the expectation of a positive role of institutional veto points (checks) to control the 
investment decisions of public sector officials, reduce the ‘political’ risk and the risk of accruing 
unsustainable fiscal liabilities. The result, however, is in most cases not significant.  
A very interesting result is found for fiscal rules, which display a positive and significant coefficient 
before 2008 -when the SGP was weakly stringent and domestic fiscal rules were not widespread. 
PPPs have been a preferred option for financially constrained governments to help them meeting the 
fiscal target – mostly on the budget balance - established in national and supranational rules. On the 
contrary, after 2008 the new version of the SGP, the stricter EU surveillance, and the increased 
number and strength of domestic fiscal rules seem to reduce the scope for the PPP option. However, 
in this case the coefficient is much smaller and less significant. This result is interesting because there 
is no previous evidence of a clear relationship between public investment and fiscal rules13.  
The vulnerability of institutions, in the form of corruption in the public sector is positively related to 
PPPs investments: however, the coefficient is not significant. This is in line with Rosell and Saz-
                                                          
13 Galì and Perotti (2003) argue against the relevance of the SGP on public investments. Bacchiocchi et al. (2011) do 
not find evidence of a role for the SGP in EU high-debt countries and stress the role of debt sustainability concerns. 
EMU membership seems to matter, instead, at low level of debt. Mehrotra and Välilä (2006) also find that SGP does not 
have a systemic impact on public investment.  
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Carranza (2019), who associate corruption only to emergent countries, and Mota and Moreira (2015) 
who do not find any significant effect of corruption perception on PPPs in the EU countries. 
When turning to the political drivers, we find that political fragmentation decreases the use of PPPs, 
especially after 2008: conflicting demands do not allow complex investment decisions and imply 
gridlocks. In terms of political orientation left-wing governments are confirmed to be more supportive 
of PPPs (as in Mota and Moreira, 2015) than right and centre governments that display negative 
coefficients.  
Robustness checks are provided in Table A.1 in Annex. We estimate a conditional fixed effect model 
on the same subsamples. The checks confirm almost all the findings with the exception of the variable 
for the government consumption share. In this case a stable and negative relation over the two sub-
periods is observable.  
6. Conclusions  
In a time of questions how to increase, renew and improve infrastructure, we investigate the EU 
countries choices in terms of PPP adoption and the reasons for the PPP market distribution. Our focus 
is on the fiscal, political and institutional setting. Our overarching result is that both before and after 
the crisis, public finance conditions have been highly relevant. First, there has been an incentive to 
adopt PPP to finance investments by those EU countries that were constrained by the state of their 
public finances, in particular their budget balance. This result is due to the possibility of off-balance 
sheet registration of the PPP projects and calls for attention because, if PPPs are employed to avoid 
financial constraints in the short term, in the medium/long term they can create unsustainable fiscal 
liabilities, unless adequate controls and safeguards are implemented. Indeed, as Engel et al. (2014) 
demonstrate, PPPs’ impact on the government intertemporal budget is similar to that of public 
provision and PPPs should be accordingly recorded. Transparency principles should be applied also 
to recording PPP-related contingent liabilities, which expose governments to the risk of severe fiscal 
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problems. On-balance-sheet recording, at least in internal documentation—as in France—could be a 
first important step for all EU countries. Other complementary provisions to mitigate the fiscal 
illusion logic could be employed, such as spending caps to public officials (Maskin and Tirole, 2008), 
ceilings for the stock of PPP-related contingent liabilities, maximum annual payment amounts for 
PPPs, or independent agencies giving advice on PPP contracts and performance.  
High levels of debt create sustainability concerns that increase the countries financial vulnerability 
and undermine the investors’ confidence and their interest in PPPs. This result complements previous 
empirical evidence (Bacchiocchi et al., 2011, in particular) that points to high levels of public debt 
distorting public expenditure allocation and hampering public investment. The consequence is that 
the decline of public investments in high-debt countries cannot be countered by resorting PPPs, unless 
progress is made in debt reduction so to win the investors’ confidence.   
At the same time, we find that institutional provisions – check and balances, in particular – do not 
provide sufficient control of the PPP bias and that PPPs in the EU countries are under the influence 
of political competition and government’s preferences for current expenditures. However, SGP and 
domestic fiscal rules are relevant for PPPs adoption. During the pre-crisis period, the presence of 
fiscal rules proves to be an incentive to opt for PPPs to facilitate meeting the budget targets. After the 
crisis, more numerous and stricter domestic rules, the reformed SGP (with an increased number of 
constraints and a limited flexibility on investments) and EU surveillance, seem to have reduced the 
scope for a biased employment of PPP contracts to carry out investment projects.  
These empirical findings should contribute to the understanding of the distribution of PPPs in the EU 
countries. Besides, in presence of infrastructure quality decline and new investment challenges, we 
highlight the need to carefully consider the role played by public finance factors to evaluate the 





Annex     
Table A.1 – Conditional fixed-effects model 
 Sub-periods 
 1990-2008 2008-2015 
GDP -3.5* -3.9* -3.6*  3.4 3.8 4.0 
 (-2.46) (-2.50) (-2.39)   (-1.58) (-1.84) (-1.95)        
int_rate 0.009 0.009 0.01 -0.004 0.003 0.006 
 (-0.31) (-0.28) (-0.37) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.18)        
exp 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.1*** 0.2*** 0.1*** 
 (-3.65) (-3.71) (-3.65) (-3.62) (-3.7) (-3.51)        
rules 1.874* 2.051* 1.646 -1.6*** -1.5*** -1.4** 
 (-1.99) (-2.1) (-1.22) (-4.48) (-3.38) (-3.25)        
totrev 0.301 0.558 0.507 4.969*** 5.514*** 6.118*** 
 (-0.23) (-0.37) (-0.43) (-6.65) (-3.99) (-4.02)        
debt -3.038*** -3.138*** -3.001*** -1.017* -1.268* -1.198* 
 (-4.22) (-4.44) (-5.55)   (-1.99) (-2.48) (-2.13)        
budget balance 1.3 1.2 1.0 -8.7*** -8.7*** -8.9*** 
 (-0.69) (-0.53) (-0.49) (-3.46) (-3.42) (-3.50)        
eufund 82.3*** 78.5*** 80.3*** -35.2** -44.3** -47.8*** 
 (-8.14) (-6.34) (-8.92) (-3.10) (-3.14) (-3.69)        
gov_cons -0.59 -0.557 -0.661 -2.0* -1.893 -1.839 
 (-0.55) (-0.50) (-0.57)   (-2.22) (-1.95) (-1.78)        
pub_corr 5.589 5.24 4.587 3.752* 3.771* 3.870* 
 (-1.239 (-1.13) (-0.97) (-2.26) (-2.04) (-2.01)        
fracgm -0.2 -0.21 0.01 -0.02 -0.7 -1.0* 
 (-0.25) (-0.29) -0.02 (-0.05) (-1.15) (-2.41)        
checks -0.324* -0.329* -0.355*  -0.0427 0.0135 -0.0194 
 (-2.46) (-2.43) (-2.45)   (-0.98) -0.36 (-0.31)        
left 0.0004           0.003*   
 (-0.24)           (-2.42)          
right  0.0005           -0.0008  
  (-0.25)           (-0.54)         
cent   -0.002   -0.002 
   (-1.14)     (-0.69)        
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